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TO THE
PRINCE REGENT,
ON THE DISPUTE WITH THE AMERICANS.

LETTER V.

SIR;

I now proceed to place before your Royal Highness an account of the measures proposed by the American Congress to be adopted, in consequence of the refusal of our government to comply with the demands of the American President, relative to the Orders in Council and the Impressment of American Seamen.

The Lower House of Congress began by receiving and approving of a Report of their Committee of foreign relations, which Report I subjoin to this Letter. That Report can be regarded in no other light, than as a *manifesto* against England. It sets forth the grounds of complaint; and it then recommends preparations for war.

This recommendation has been acted upon, and preparations for war are actually going on.—An Act was brought forward immediately for raising a body of regular troops; and, after much deliberation, this Act appears to have been passed, the number of troops amounting to 25 thousand men. And, here let me beg your Royal Highness to observe, that these troops are to have a bounty in *lands*, of which every man is to receive 160 Acres. These men will have the *soil* to fight for; their motive of action will not be of that vague and indefinite kind which is held forth by Colonel Dillon, in his work addressed, as he says, by permission, to you. That these troops are not intended for purposes of mere *defence* will be obvious to your Royal Highness; but, of the way in which they will probably be employed I shall speak by and by.

Besides these the President is to be enabled to employ 50 thousand Volunteers, whose services may, at any time, be extended beyond the limits of the United States, if the parties volunteering choose to be so employed.

The Militia, consisting of all the able men in the country, without any except-

tion as to rank or degree, the President may call out in such numbers as may be found necessary.

Some national ships are to be built; those that they now have, are to be repaired and armed; gunboats are to be fitted out; and the *merchants ships* are to be permitted to arm and to defend themselves at sea. But, the greatest of the maritime measures is, a high reward to be offered to any Americans on board British ships, and to the *associates of such Americans*, in case of their *bringing in to an American port* any British ship of war. This is, in fact, a reward offered to the crews of British ships to desert to the enemy, and to carry their ship with them, upon the same principle, I presume, that our Consul at Valencia and our commandant at Gibraltar are, in our public prints, said to have offered so much a man to each soldier of the French army that should desert to them, and so much in addition provided the deserter brought *his horse*. Whether this be consistent with morality, I shall not, at present, enquire; but, of this I am very sure, that the measure adopted, or proposed to be adopted, by the Congress, is of a very dangerous tendency, especially when we consider how large a portion of Americans and other foreigners we have on board of our ships.

These measures are not, Sir, to be considered as the measures of a faction, whose object, in getting the nation into a war, is to create the means of fattening themselves and their families and dependents and supporters; they are the measures of *the people* of America, speaking through the lips of their real Representatives, unbribed themselves and chosen without the aid of bribery; and they arise out of the grounds of complaint against us, which I before had the honour to lay before your Royal Highness. The prostituted press of London has, for many months past, been endeavouring to make its deluded readers believe, that the partizans of England, in America, were the most numerous; and that, if the government engaged in war against us, the people would turn against it, and that a separation of the States would

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take place. I endeavoured to guard the public and your Royal Highness against these delusive statements; and we now see, that, though there are two parties in America, both parties have united against us, with as much cordiality as the two parties in our House of Commons united against Mr. Madocks's motion of the 11th of May 1809 for an enquiry into the Sale of Seats in that Honourable House, and, surely, an union more cordial than that has seldom been heard of between opponents of any description. Those members of the Congress who have voted against the war with England are so few, and those who have spoken against it, are, for the most part, so notoriously contemptible, that the measure may be regarded as having been adopted without opposition. The Congress has not been long elected; they have just received the instructions of their constituents; and it will not be long before those constituents will again have an opportunity of deciding upon their merits or demerits. None of those members hold offices of any sort; none of them have pensions or sinecures, and none of them can touch, in any way, a farthing of the money which may be expended in consequence of their votes for the creation of any office. This being the case, the voice of the Congress must be the *voice of the nation*; and it would be delusion unexampled to believe, that the people of America are not entering heartily into this war.

Our prostituted press, unable any longer to keep up the delusion of the disinclination of the American nation to resist by force of arms, now tell the public, that the war will not be of *long duration*; and, this prediction they found chiefly upon the supposition, that America has not the *pecuniary means* sufficient for the carrying on of war.

The *collection of taxes* is, indeed, what the Americans do not like; but, it does not follow, that, for a great purpose, they would not submit to a trifling tax; and a very trifling tax indeed would suffice. It is true, that they now pay but little. In America the taxes do not amount to a *Dollar* a head, taking the people one with another; here, if we exclude the army, the navy, the paupers, and the prisoners, the taxes amount to *fifty Dollars* a head. By putting on a second *Dollar*, the Government would double its means; and, surely, an American can pay 2 *Dollars* as well as an Englishman can pay 50. One of your Royal

Highness's servants, that stirring old gentleman, Mr. George Rose, assures us, that our population *increases* in war, and that the longer the war continues the faster we increase in numbers. He says nothing of the increase of *paupers*; but, upon his principle, American population cannot be checked by war; for, he will hardly contend, that this quality of fecundity appertains exclusively to us. Another of your servants, Lord Harrowby, has lately asserted, that the *prosperity* of this country is now greater than it ever was. Your Royal Highness will not, therefore, believe, that America is to be beggared and ruined by a war, which, in all probability, will last only a few years.

Besides, the resources of America in her *lands* are very great. She has, owing to her peculiar situation, a species of fund to draw upon which no other nation has. She is now about to raise an army with a bounty, in money, of 16 *Dollars* a man. The rest of his bounty is to consist of *lands*, which, of course, cost the people nothing; and, in this same way a large portion of the demands of a war may and will be met.

Much has been said about the *natural ties* between the two countries. This, considered as an impediment to war, is the grossest of all the delusions, and never could have been practised upon any nation but this. All that remains of a recollection of the former connection is calculated to produce hostility. It is fine enough to flourish away upon the subject of the Americans being of the *same family* with us; but, there are many and many hundreds and thousands of men in America, who recollect that their fathers were killed by those Brunswickers and Hessians and other German Mercenaries, whom England hired to send against them, because they insisted upon the principle of *No Taxation without Representation*. These ideas of kindred might do very well in a poem; but, they are despicable in political reflections, and only discover the folly, or the wickedness, of those who obtrude them upon the public.

There appears, then, no good reason to suppose, that the Americans will not enter upon the war, and that they will not persevere in it, till they obtain its object, or, at least, till they have fairly tried their strength. As to the *consequences* of such war to us, some of them I should regard as ultimately beneficial. The *loss* of Canada I should deem a gain, though it is

worth to us a thousand Empires in the East; that is to say, it is not a thousandth part so mischievous to us.

Another loss would be deeply felt, I mean, the loss, *for ever*, of America as a market for our goods. Lord Sheffield has lately said, that what America does not take *this year*, she must take *next year*; that, pass what Acts she will, she must, in the end, be clothed by us. His Lordship's mind does not keep pace with the events of the world. The Morning Post and Courier are, I suspect, his chief instructors as to what has been passing for the last ten years; or, he would have known, that manufactures have arrived at great perfection in America; that she is able to supply herself; and that she already *exports* cotton and wool in a partly manufactured state. A war of a few years continuance would sever the two countries for ever as to manufactures; and, this is one reason why the government of America, which wishes to cut off the connection with England, is disposed for war. This, however, is not, in *my opinion*, an evil. A temporary one it is: but, I can see no good that can arise to England from being the workshop for America, while we do not raise corn enough to feed ourselves.

But, Sir, there are consequences, which may be produced by a war with America, well calculated to make one think seriously on the event. MR. JOEL BARLOW, who, in the year 1792, went as a deputy from a Society of men in England to present a congratulatory address to the National Convention of France, and who was, at that time, hunted down and proscribed like PAINE and many others, is now American Ambassador at the court of Napoleon, where he has to negotiate with COUNT DARU, who, in that same year 1792, was in England, and was chased out of England along with MR. CHAUVELIN. These two men, who are old acquaintances, will not be long in coming to a clear understanding. They have both now an opportunity of repaying the kindness they received from England, and there can be little doubt of their having the disposition to do it.

By a hearty co-operation between America and France, fleets, and formidable fleets too, may be sent to sea much sooner than our overweening confidence will, perhaps, permit us to believe; and, if a force of forty ships of the line, with a suitable number of frigates, can be sent out

from the ports of France and Holland, in the course of a year, there is no telling what may be the consequence to this kingdom. America has *more than a hundred thousand seamen*; she has facilities of all sorts for building ships; and, with the aid of France, would soon become truly formidable; because, we should not dare to send a merchant ship to any part of the world without a convoy. Americans would enter into the French naval service; those, who are now captains of merchantmen, would be tempted with the honour of commanding ships of war; they have, for the greater part, some particular cause of hatred against England, and would be animated by the double motive of ambition and revenge.

No man at all acquainted with American seamen will ever speak of them with contempt. They are universally allowed to be excellent seamen; active and daring, but not more so than they are skilful and cool. These are precisely the ingredients that the Emperor Napoleon stands in need of; and, what, then, Sir, shall be said of those English Ministers, who shall force them into his hands!

A war with America would hasten the work of revolution in Mexico, and it would have the further effect of making that country, in its state of independence, start in hostility to us; because, between North and South America there would inevitably be a close connection. Indeed, Sir, this appears to me to be one of the great objects which America has, in now going to war. She sees, that a revolution is taking place in South America; she sees, that, if that revolution be crushed, England, under the character of *Protector of Spain*, will, in fact, govern South America, if for no other purpose, for that of keeping the mines out of the hands of France. That England should govern South America is what North America can never permit; therefore the latter must, by some means or other, assist the South Americans to secure their independence; and this assistance North America cannot give with effect, *unless she be at war with England*; for, as she has seen, in the case of the *Floridas*, the moment she makes a move towards the Spanish territory, England steps forward, as the Protector of Ferdinand, and complains of her conduct.

If, therefore, the President of the United States has resolved upon doing all that he is able to promote and secure the inde-

pendence of South America, he must also have resolved upon a war with England, which, in that case, is not to be avoided by a repeal of the Orders in Council and an abandonment of our practice of impressing American Seamen, unless we have the wisdom to declare before hand, that we shall leave the South Americans wholly to themselves. This is the golden opportunity for the South Americans to assert their rights and to become free. Our war against Napoleon on the land disables us, (if we were inclined to do it) from sending soldiers to support the old system; and our fleets are exceedingly well employed in preventing Napoleon from sending soldiers for that purpose; the government of Old Spain has neither troops nor ships; there are no Brunswickers or Hessians or Waldeckers or Anspachers to be hired by the government of Old Spain, as in the case of the war for independence in North America; and thus are the South Americans left to settle the dispute with their own colonial governments.

To this state of things the American President, as appears from his Speech at the opening of the Session, has not been inattentive; and, it appears to me very clear, that we have here the real foundation of the sudden change of the tone of the American Government towards us. It may be asked, how these views of the United States comport with those of the Emperor of France; and whether he will approve of a separation of South America from Old Spain, of which he, with but too good reason, expects to be the master? In the first place, he has seen the result of a war against independence in North America, and the love of dominion must have bereft him of reason, if he fail to profit from so memorable a lesson. In the next place, he must see, that, unless New Spain become independent, it will become dependent upon England, he not having a sufficient maritime force to keep it in colonial subjection to himself against the will of England. And, even if he were to receive it in its colonial state, at a peace, he would only be entailing upon himself and his heirs the possession of a vulnerable point, exposed to the attack of England. These reasons are quite sufficient to induce him not to oppose any project for separating New from Old Spain, who, notwithstanding the independence of the countries containing the mines, would still be a great receptacle of the treasures thence derived.

But, when to these reasons are added the many weighty reasons for seeing America engaged in a war with England, there can be no doubt as to what will be his decision. Such a war would favour his views against us in so many ways that the bare enumeration would be tedious. It would lock up the troops that we have now in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Canada, and would demand new levies of militia and fencibles in those provinces; it would compel us to send a larger naval force to North America and the West Indies than is now there; it would compel us to send convoys with every fleet of merchant vessels to the end of their voyage; it would, of course, divide our fleets, and thereby weaken our strength in the European seas; it would (as far as that is an evil) make it much more expensive and difficult to maintain our armies in Spain and Portugal; it would greatly augment our expences, and, at the same time, our danger.

If I were asked what ought to be done to prevent war with America, I should say, certainly, first repeal the Orders in Council; but, I am far from supposing, that that measure alone would be sufficient. Indeed, it seems to me, that the Impressment of American seamen must be abandoned; and to this I would add a declaration, that England would not interfere in the affairs of Spanish South America. There would then be an end of the causes of ill-blood; we should then have in America, not a *faction* for us, but we should have the whole nation for our friends. We should also have a friend in South America; and, to these countries we might look with confidence for the means of forming a combination against the overwhelming power of France.

I am well aware, Sir, of the great obstacles to such an arrangement; but, those obstacles it is in the power of your Royal Highness to remove. This country, which has so long been suffering, now looks to you for some mitigation, at least, of its sufferings; and I, therefore, trust, that the dawn of your authority will not be clouded with an additional war; a war that will complete the round of English hostility to nations looked upon as free. It was a fatal day which saw the sword of England drawn against the republicans of France. What a lesson do the effects of that war hold out to your Royal Highness! There is no man, be he who he may, who does not now dread theulti-

mate consequences. That that war might have been prevented all the world is now convinced; and, if war should take place with America, the same opinion with respect to it will hereafter prevail, but it will prevail, perhaps, when it will be useless. Princes, more than other men, are liable to be deceived, and it is too often a matter of great difficulty to undeceive them; yet, of what vast importance it is, that they should know the truth! And how urgent a duty it is to convey it to their ear if one has the power! The lives of thousands and the happiness of millions depend upon the decision which your Royal Highness shall make with regard to this question of war or peace with America; and, therefore, that you should weigh it well before you decide must be the anxious hope of every man who has a sincere regard for the fame and the safety of the country.

I am, &c. &c.
Wm. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate,
13th February, 1812.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

MERCENARY COMPASSION.—I have often had occasion to observe upon the wonderful sensibility of our mercenaries of the press, with regard to those persons, who suffer under the laws and edicts of the Emperor of France, an instance of which sensibility I have now before me in an article in the Times News-paper of the 10th instant, which article is as follows:—
“An Imperial Decree was published at “Hamburg on the 12th of last month, “enacting, that the individuals confined “in the prisons, and condemned to labour “in the public works, should be sent in “fetters to such places as the Minister of “Marine shall appoint. Those, however, “are excepted, whose time will expire in “less than six months, and those who with- “in that time will attain the age of 70. “Many of these *unfortunate persons* were “*merchants and agents*, who have been in- “volved in ruin, and thus INHUMANLY “PUNISHED, on suspicion of not having “strictly adhered to the Continental Sys- “tem.”—What! is Napoleon accused of INHUMAN acts because he, or his judges rather, *imprison* people? Is it IN- HUMAN to imprison men in the dominions of France for *corresponding with the enemy*? As to its being for *suspicion*, it is nonsense; they may as well say, that it is

for *nothing at all*; and, in that case, Napoleon would be a *fool*, which nobody will believe him to be. These people are thus punished for *smuggling*, or *corresponding with the enemy*, the latter of which crimes is death with us, and so is the former too in many cases. And, as for *suspicion*, any one Justice of the Peace has the power, at any time, to send to gaol for a month, any one who is found near *any of the coasts* of this island, and who cannot give a *good account* of himself; that is to say, such an account as shall appear good to any Justice of the Peace before whom he may be brought.

—These mercenaries, therefore; these literary panders, have, in this case, over-shot their mark, in talking about their friends on the other side of the water being *inhumanly* punished by imprisonment. Their compassion is of a wandering turn. It flies so far to seek for objects, and expends itself upon those of the nature of whose offences they can hardly be much acquainted. Why do they not give us a list of some of these “*inhumanly punished*” men, and tell us the nature of their crimes and the length of their imprisonment, and also the sort of treatment they have in prison; whether they be put into solitary cells or not.—No: this is precisely what the hypocrites dare not do. They can go no further than general and loose assertions. I challenge them to the *detail*. Their paragraphs, upon this subject, are, I am well assured, gross fabrications. But, this is what they live by. They would, for their own emolument, see all the world engaged in cutting each other’s throats.

PORtUGUESE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS.—The following Decree of the *Prince Regent of Portugal*, issued at the Brazils on the 5th of October 1811, will shew that His Royal Highness is not so inattentive to the affairs of the mother country as some persons may have imagined him to be.—The production is a master-piece of its kind, and, as such I recommend a perusal of it to the reader previous to the remarks that I have to offer upon it.—
“Most illustrious and excellent Sir,—
“Some copies of two works published in “this capital, (Lisbon) from the Royal “Printing-office, and licensed by the Su- “preme Tribunal of Justice, having ap- “peared in the city of Rio Janeiro; one “being the translation of a work which “was published respecting the *cabinet of St. Cloud*, containing a letter, &c. highly in-

“ *jurious to the character of her Majesty the Queen of Spain, and which re-echoes all the calumnies which have been raised against that august and unfortunate Personage ; and the second being a pamphlet, in which the beauties of the English Constitution are exhibited in the most brilliant colours,— nearly going the length to recommend its adoption for the Portuguese nation, (as though it were possible for each nation to divest itself of its government, and adopt a new one, without the greatest inconvenience) ; and it being dangerous in times so calamitous, to expose to the eyes of nations, pictures from the non-completion of which no advantage can be derived : it is the will of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, that it shall be immediately made known to the said Tribunal of Supreme Justice, how great was his Royal Highness’s displeasure on learning that it had licensed the above mentioned works ; and he hereby orders, that henceforth great vigilance may be displayed on this head, by selecting for the office of Censors, men of talents and wisdom, who entertain views of a sound and clear policy ; and the said Tribunal is also to understand, that it must not license— 1st, the publications of original works, or translations, in which the memory and reputations of sovereigns may be insulted, and more particularly those who may be relations or allies of his Royal Family :— 2d, works, in which the religion of the State, or even other sects of Christianity established in the great states of Europe, or their forms of Government, may be directly or indirectly attacked, so as to engage the minds of the people, who, unable to reflect with just discernment on such subjects, are the more easily led into errors, which, for a length of years, may militate against their happiness :— 3d, the said tribunal is to encourage works which tend to the progress of science, arts, and industry ; and chiefly such as inculcate the sound principles of administration, improvement by useful reforms, and real interests, which are capable of conferring on nations the greatest benefits. From these no evils can arise ; while, on the contrary, works of a different description, in the present crisis, by the enthusiasm which they introduce, are likely to direct the attention of the people to ideas from which most assuredly no good can result. Finally, it is under these principles that*

“ the Tribunal is to establish the censorship of books, having in view to avoid the publication, through the channel of the press, of accusations pregnant with calumny against individuals, whereby great inconvenience may be sustained. It is unnecessary to remind the Tribunal that the Prince Regent has forbidden that any thing against or in favour of the Cortes of Spain shall be published ; and that on these subjects nothing shall be permitted to issue from the press of the king. dom, as his Royal Highness is convinced, that such publications are more likely to disseminate great evil than be productive of beneficial effects among the Portuguese people. Your Excellency will make all this known to the said Supreme Tribunal of Justice, that it may be there recorded and executed with the most scrupulous attention.” — The Prince Regent of Portugal does not know what he is about, as to this matter. He does not understand the uses of a press half so well as we do in this country ; if he did, he would never have issued such an order. He would rather have proclaimed aloud THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS, and would, at the same time, have appointed an Attorney General with full power to prosecute, at his pleasure, any printer or writer ; to select what persons he pleased for prosecution ; to keep prosecutions hanging over their heads as long as he pleased ; to call them up to trial and then to postpone the trial as often as he pleased ; to keep them in this state all their lives if he chose it ; to obtain judgment against them and then to let them remain without being sentenced for years, and after all bring them up and have them sentenced ; to demand a Special Jury, nominated by another Officer of the Crown, to try the persons whom he chose to prosecute ; to hold to bail any persons against whom he chose to commence prosecutions ; to compel them to pay for a copy of any Information that he chose to file against them ; and, lastly, to put a stop to such prosecutions ; wholly to quash them, or to keep them suspended in any of their stages, at his pleasure. This would have been a much better thing for the Prince Regent of Portugal, who would then have had to boast of having given his people that inestimable blessing A FREE PRESS. — And, as to the ENGLISH CONSTITUTION, as now practised, what are his Royal Highness’s objections to that ? Does he see, that it operates in such a way that

he need be afraid of seeing it adopted in Portugal? Does he find it deficient in any of those powers which "a *sound policy*," as he calls it, demands? Why, then, should he object to have its BEAUTIES exhibited, and made "*as notorious as the Sun at noon day?*" If, indeed, the picture was not a fair one; if it was a sham; if it was intended to cheat the people of Portugal; if its object was to delude the people of Portugal into a belief, that the English Constitution was what it really is not; then, indeed, there was a solid objection to it; but, if the picture was a true one of the English Constitution, as now practised, I really can see no harm that a display of the whole of its BEAUTIES, a statement of the whole of its EFFECTS upon the people; I can see no harm, that these could have done to the interests of the Prince Regent of Portugal.—But, there is one fact, connected with this subject, well calculated to make the reader laugh. It is this: that the presses, the very presses, I mean the types and the presses, whence these BEAUTIES have issued at Lisbon, were *a present from our king to the Regency in Portugal!* Aye, and have been PAID FOR OUT OF THE TAXES RAISED UPON THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND! The reader will hardly believe this; but, it is, nevertheless, strictly true; and the item stands, in the government accounts for the year 1810, thus:

"To Messrs. Robert Wal-	£. s. d.
"ker and Company, for the	
"Expence of two printing	
"presses, sent as a present	
"to the Regency of Portu-	
"gal,..... 706 17 2	

What do you think of that, reader? Do you not think it a little hard, that the Prince Regent should object to the printing of a few of the BEAUTIES of our Constitution at these presses, which the government has made us pay for? Surely these presses might have been suffered to sound forth the praises of our happy constitution! To discussions about the proceedings in the Cortes of Spain; to observations on the character and conduct of the Queen of Spain; to any remarks, or any hints, touching *Crowned-heads*, or *Royal families*; to all these there might have been some ground to object; but it is very hard, that our "happy constitution" should not be permitted to be praised, extolled, chaunted in hymns, and deified, from the presses which we ourselves have

sent out and paid for. This is very hard indeed. We send out a part of our FREE PRESS, and then, behold, it is not to have the LIBERTY to exhibit the beauties of our own happy constitution! It is not to be allowed to hold forth to the rest of the world those lovely lineaments the sight of which we daily have at home! The Prince Regent does, however, permit these presses to be used in the printing of works on the *Arts and Sciences*. This is a great deal, to be sure! Men may say what they please about the manner of preserving gooseberries and of gauging beer. There is full LIBERTY of the press, as far as relates to these matters, in Portugal,..... and so there is in England!

I wished to offer some observations upon the debate in the Common Council, on the motion for a grant of money to the National Education Society; but must postpone them till my next.—The debate which took place last night (Thursday) on the subject of the *Dispute with America*, I shall not fail to remark on in my next.—The die appears to be cast; for, if our Ministers expect the Americans to give way; if they put the question of peace or war upon that footing, there will assuredly be war. The Americans will laugh when they read, that our statesmen *do not wish to destroy them*; and that they with sorrow foresee the *ruin that will fall upon America*.—They will hardly believe their eyes. If such expressions have any effect upon their conduct it will be to add to their haste to show us how much they despise such threats.—One thing, however, will give them some satisfaction. They will see, that they are, at last, become worthy of *notice* in England. Hitherto, they have never been thought any more of than was thought of Cape Breton or New-Brunswick. They have been a sort of bye-word. Nothing, in point of importance, compared with the ruler of the Brazils or the King of Sardinia. I always said, that the day would come, when they would *force themselves upon our attention*; and that day is already arrived. It is not three months since the prostituted news-papers declared, that it was a matter of *perfect indifference to us* whether America chose war or peace; but, now, they announce "*important intelligence from America*." They will find it to be every day of more and more importance.—Foreseeing, as I do, great calamities from this war, I cannot but feel some satisfaction at having been the first to endeavour to prevent it by pointing out its

dangers and shewing that they might be avoided by safe and honourable means, which endeavours I have continued to the present moment; and this every one must confess, that, if we enter upon a war with America, we run into all its dangers with our eyes open.

W^M. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
14th February, 1812.*

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

AMERICA.—*The Committee to whom was referred that part of the President's Message, which relates to our Foreign Affairs, beg leave to report in part:*

That they have endeavoured to give to the subject submitted to them, that full and dispassionate consideration, which is due to one so intimately connected with the interest, the peace, the safety, and the honour of their country.—Your Committee will not encumber your journals and waste your patience with a detailed history of all the various matters growing out of our foreign relations. The cold recital of wrongs, of injuries, and aggressions, known and felt by every Member of this Union, could have no other effect than to deaden the national sensibility, and render the public mind callous to injuries with which it is already too familiar.—Without recurring, then, to the multiplied wrongs of partial or temporary operation, of which we have so just cause of complaint against the two great belligerents, your Committee will only call your attention, at this time, to the systematic aggression of those powers, authorised by their edicts, against neutral commerce; a system which, as regarded its principles, was founded on pretensions that went to the subversion of our national independence; and which, although now abandoned by one power, is, in its broad and destructive operation, as still enforced by the other, sapping the foundation of our prosperity.—It is more than five years since England and France, in violation of those principles of justice and public law, held sacred by all civilized nations, commenced this unprecedented system, by seizing the property of the citizens of the United States, peaceably pursuing their lawful commerce on the high seas. To shield themselves from the odium which such outrage must incur, each of the belligerents sought a pretext in the conduct of the other—each attempting to justify his sys-

tem of rapine as a retaliation for similar acts on the part of his enemy. As if the law of nations, founded on the eternal rules of justice, could sanction a principle, which, if engrafted into our municipal code, would excuse the crime of one robber, upon the sole plea, that the unfortunate object of his rapacity was also a victim to the injustice of another. The fact of priority could be true as to one only of the parties; and, whether true or false, could furnish no ground of justification.—The United States, thus unexpectedly and violently assailed by the two greatest powers in Europe, withdrew their citizens and property from the ocean, and cherishing the blessing of peace, although the occasion would have fully justified war, sought redress in an appeal to the justice and magnanimity of the belligerents. When this appeal had failed of the success which was due to its moderation, other measures, founded on the same pacific policy, but applying to the interests, instead of the justice, of the belligerents, were resorted to. Such was the character of the non-intercourse and non-importation laws, which invited the return of both powers to their former state of amicable relations, by offering commercial advantages to the one who should first revoke his hostile edicts, and imposing restrictions on the other.—France, at length, availing herself of the proffers made equally to her and her enemy, by the Non-Importation Law of May, 1810, announced the repeal on the 1st of the following November, of the Decrees of Berlin and Milan. And it affords a subject of sincere congratulation to be informed, through the official organs of the Government, that those Decrees are, so far at least as our rights are concerned, really and practically at an end.—It was confidently expected, that this act on the part of France would have been immediately followed by a revocation on the part of Great Britain of her Orders in Council. If our reliance on her justice had been impaired by the wrongs she had inflicted; yet, when she had plighted her faith to the world, that the sole motive of her aggression on neutral commerce was to be found in the Berlin and Milan Decrees, we looked forward to the extinction of those Decrees, as the period when the freedom of the seas would be again restored.—In this reasonable expectation we have, however, been disappointed. A year has elapsed since the French Decrees were rescinded; and yet Great Britain, instead

of retracting *pari passu* that course of unjustifiable attack on neutral rights, in which she professed to be only the reluctant follower of France, has advanced with bolder and continually increasing strides. To the categorical demands lately made by our Government for the repeal of her Orders in Council, she has affected to deny the practical extinction of the French Decrees; and she has, moreover, advanced a new and unexpected demand, increasing in hostility the Orders themselves. She has insisted, through her accredited Minister at this place, that the repeal of the Orders in Council must be preceded, not only by the practical abandonment of the Decrees of Berlin and Milan, so far as they infringe the neutral rights of the United States; but, by the renunciation on the part of France of the whole of her system of commercial warfare against Great Britain, of which those Decrees originally formed a part.—This system is understood to consist in a course of measures adopted by France and the other powers on the Continent, subject to, or in alliance with her, calculated to prevent the introduction into their territories of the products and manufactures of Great Britain and her Colonies, and to annihilate her trade with them. However hostile these regulations may be, on the part of France towards Great Britain, or however sensibly the latter may feel their effects, they are, nevertheless, to be regarded only as the expedients of one enemy against another, for which the United States, as a neutral power, can in no respect be responsible: they are, too, in exact conformity with those which Great Britain has herself adopted and acted upon in time of peace as well as war. And it is not to be presumed that France would yield to the unauthorised demand of America, what she seems to have considered as one of the most powerful engines of the present war.—Such are the pretensions upon which Great Britain founds the violation of the maritime rights of the United States; pretensions not theoretical merely, but followed up by a desolating war upon our unprotected commerce. The ships of the United States, laden with the products of our own soil and labour, navigated by our own citizens, and peaceably pursuing a lawful trade, are seized on our own coasts, at the very mouths of our harbours, condemned and confiscated.—Your Committee are not, however, of that sect whose worship is at the shrine of a calculating

avarice. And while we are laying before you the just complaints of our merchants against the plunder of their ships and cargoes, we cannot refrain from presenting to the justice and humanity of our country the unhappy case of our impressed seamen. Although the groans of these victims of barbarity for the loss of (what should be dearer to the Americans than life) their liberty; although the cries of their wives and children in the privation of protectors and parents, have, of late, been drowned in the louder clamours at the loss of property: yet is the practice of forcing our mariners into the British navy, in violation of the rights of our flag, carried on with unabated rigor and severity. If it be our duty to encourage the fair and legitimate commerce of this country by protecting the property of the merchant, then indeed, by as much as life and liberty are more estimable than ships and goods, so much more impressive is the duty to shield the persons of our seamen, whose hard and honest services are employed, equally with those of the merchants, in advancing, under the mantle of its laws, the interests of their country.—To sum up, in a word, the great causes of complaint against Great Britain, your Committee need only say, That the United States, as a sovereign and independent power, claim the right to use the ocean, which is the common and acknowledged highway of nations, for the purposes of transporting, in their own vessels, the products of their own soil, and the acquisitions of their industry, to a market in the ports of friendly nations, and to bring home, in return, such articles as their necessities or convenience may require; always regarding the rights of belligerents, as defined by the established laws of nations. Great Britain, in defiance of this incontestable right, captures every American vessel bound to, or returning from, a port where her commerce is not favoured; enslaves our seamen, and, in spite of our remonstrances, perseveres in these aggressions.—To wrongs so daring in character, and so disgraceful in their execution, it is impossible that the people of the United States should remain indifferent. We must now tamely and quietly submit, or we must resist by those means which God has placed within our reach.—Your Committee would not cast a shade over the American name, by the expression of a doubt which branch of this alternative will be embraced. The occasion is now presented when the na-

tional character, misunderstood and traduced for a time by foreign and domestic enemies, should be vindicated. If we have not rushed to the field of battle like the nations who are led by the mad ambition of a single Chief, or the avarice of a corrupted Court, it has not proceeded from a fear of war, but from our love of justice and humanity. That proud spirit of liberty and independence, which sustained our fathers in the successful assertion of their rights against foreign aggression, is not yet sunk. The patriotic fire of the revolution still burns in the American breast with a holy and unextinguishable flame, and will conduct this nation to those high destinies, which are not less the reward of dignified moderation, than of exalted valour.—But we have borne with injury until forbearance has ceased to be a virtue. The sovereignty and independence of these states, purchased and sanctified by the blood of our fathers, from whom we received them, not for ourselves only, but as the inheritance of our posterity, are deliberately and systematically violated. And the period has arrived, when, in the opinion of your Committee, it is the sacred duty of Congress to call forth the patriotism and resources of the country. By the aid of these, and with the blessing of God, we confidently trust we shall be enabled to procure that redress, which has been sought for by justice, by remonstrance and forbearance in vain.—Your Committee, reserving for a future report those ulterior measures, which, in their opinion, ought to be pursued, would, at this time, earnestly recommend, in the words of the President, “That the United States be immediately put into an armour and attitude demanded by the crisis, and corresponding with the national spirit and expectations.” And, to this end, they beg leave to submit, for the adoption of the House, the following Resolutions:—I. Resolved, That the Military Establishment, as authorised by the existing laws, ought to be immediately completed by filling up the ranks and prolonging the enlistment of the troops; and that, to encourage enlistments, a bounty in lands ought to be given in addition to the pay and bounty now allowed by law.—II. That an additional force of ten thousand regular troops ought to be immediately raised to serve for three years; and that a bounty in lands ought to be given to encourage enlistment.—III. That it is expedient to

authorise the President, under proper regulations, to accept the service of any number of volunteers, not exceeding fifty thousand, to be organised, trained, and held in readiness to act on such service as the exigencies of the Government may require.—IV. That the President be authorised to order out, from time to time, such detachments of the militia, as in his opinion the public service may require.—V. That all the vessels not now in service belonging to the navy and worthy of repair, be immediately fitted up and put in commission.—VI. That it is expedient to permit our merchant vessels, owned exclusively by resident citizens, and commanded and navigated solely by citizens, to arm, under proper regulations to be prescribed by law, in self-defence, against all unlawful proceedings towards them on the high seas.

Report of Mr. A. GALLATIN, Secretary of the Treasury, laid before the Congress, 22d Nov. 1811.

Receipts and Expenditures.

I. TO THE END OF THE YEAR 1811.—
The actual receipts into the Treasury, during the year ending on the 30th of September, 1811, have consisted of the following sums, viz.

Dollars.

Customs, sales of lands, arrears, repayments, and all other branches of revenue, amounting together, as appears by the statement (E) to...	13,541,446 37
Temporary loan of 31st December, 1810.....	2,750,000 0

Total amount of receipts...	16,291,446 37
Making together with the balance in the Treasury on the 1st of October, 1810, and amounting to	3,459,029 72

An aggregate of	19,750,476 9
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The disbursements during the same year have been as followeth, viz.

Civil department, including miscellaneous expences and those incident to the intercourse with foreign nations.....	1,360,858 93
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Army, fortifications, arms and arsenals	2,129,000
Navy Department	2,136,000
Indian do.	142,725
	4,407,725 0
Payments for interest on the public debt	2,225,800 93
	7,994,384 91
Total current expences ...	
Reimbursement of the temporary loan (in March and September, 1811)...	2,750,000 0
Payments on account of the principal of the public debt	5,058,272 82
Amounting together, as will appear more in detail by the statement (E) to.....	15,802,657 73
And leaving in the Treasury on the 30th of Sept. 1811, a balance of	3,947,818 36
	19,750,476 09

The actual receipts arising from revenue alone, and exclusively of the temporary loan since reimbursed, appear from this statement to have exceeded the current expences, including therein the interest paid on the debt, by a sum of more than five millions and a half of dollars. But the payments on account of interest, during the year ending on the 30th Sept. 1811, have from an unavoidable delay in making the usual remittances to Holland, fallen short of the amount during the same period; and the real excess of receipts arising from revenue, beyond the current expences, including therein the interest accrued on the debt, amounts only to near 5,100,000 dollars.—The receipts for the last quarter of the year 1811, are estimated at 3,300,000 dollars; and the expenditures (including the payment of arrears of interest, and near 2,160,000 dollars on account of the principal of the public debt) at 4,300,000 dollars, which will leave at the end of the year a balance in the Treasury of near three millions of dollars. It will not, therefore, be necessary to resort, for the service of the present year, to the loan authorised by the act of the last Session of Congress.

II. YEAR 1812.—It is ascertained that the net revenue arising from duties on merchandize and tonnage, which has accrued during the three first quarters of the year

1811, exceeds six millions of dollars; and it may, for the whole year, be estimated at about 7,500,000 dollars.—The Custom-house bonds, outstanding on the 1st day of January, 1812, and falling due in that year, are also estimated, after deducting bad debts, at 7,500,000 dollars. This sum may therefore be assumed as the probable amount of receipts into the Treasury during the year 1812, on account of duties on merchandize and tonnage; the portion of the revenue arising from importations subsequent to the present year, which will be received in 1812, being considered sufficient to pay the debentures and expences of collection of that year.—The payments made by purchasers of public lands north of the River Ohio, having during the two last years, after deducting the expences and charges on that fund, amounted to near 600,000 dollars a year, that branch of revenue may for the present be estimated at that sum. Allowing one hundred thousand dollars for the other small items of revenue, which consist principally of arrears and repayments, the whole amount of actual receipts into the Treasury during the year 1812, may therefore be estimated at 8,200,000 dollars.—The current expences for the same year are estimated as followeth, viz.

- 1 Expences of a civil nature, Dollars. both domestic and foreign... 1,260,000
2. Military and Naval establishments, according to the estimates of those two departments, and including the additional permanent appropriations for the purchase of arms, and for Indian annuities, viz.

Army (including 32,000 dollars for militia)	2,581,000
Arsenals, arms, and ordnance	614,000
Naval department ...	2,300,000
Indian department... 220,000	
	5,915,000

3. Interest on the public debt 2,225,000

Amounting together to 9,400,000

And exceeding by 1,200,000 the probable amount of receipts. This deficit may be paid out of the sum of three millions of dollars in the Treasury. But under existing circumstances, it does not seem eligible to exhaust that fund; and the estimate of receipts being also liable to more than usual uncertainty, the propriety

of authorising a loan sufficient to supply that difference, and to defray such other extraordinary expences as may be incurred during the year, is respectfully submitted.—It must at the same time be observed, that the sum of 9,400,000 dollars, thus stated as the amount of the current expences for the year 1812, includes in fact a portion of extraordinary expences arising from the present state of affairs. For if the military and naval expenditure had been estimated at a sum not exceeding the amount actually expended for those objects during the year ending on the 30th September, 1811, that is to say, at 4,400,000 instead of 5,900,000 dollars, the estimate of receipts would exceed that of current expences.

The disbursements on account of the Naval establishment have amounted in the year ending on the 30th September, 1810, to... 1,675,000

And in the year ending on the 30th September, 1811, to..... 2,136,000

They are estimated for the year 1812, at..... 2,500,000

The disbursements on account of the Military establishment have amounted, in the year ending on the 30th September, 1810, to..... 2,309,000

And in the year ending on the 30th September, 1811, to... 2,129,000

They are estimated for the year 1812, at..... 3,195,000

But the detailed annual estimates for the year 1812, will shew that they are predicated on the employment of almost the whole of the naval force, and of the whole military establishment of the United States, as authorised by law, covering, besides several other items, all the expence of more than 17,000 effective men, in the land and sea service.

With respect to the payments on account of the principal of the debt, it is evident that an authority to borrow a sum equal to that which will be reimbursed during the year 1812, will be necessary. The payments which, according to law, must be made during that year on that account consists of

1. Annual reimbursement of six per cent. and deferred stock..... 1,570,000

2. Reimbursement of the residue of the converted stock..... 565,318 41

Amounting together to 2,135,318 41

This sum and that payable for interest, amounting together to 4,360,000 dollars, leave, in order to complete the annual appropriation of eight millions, a balance of 3,640,000 dollars, which can be applied in no other manner, than in purchases of stock at the prices limited by law. The amount which may be thus applied is therefore uncertain.

PUBLIC DEBT.—It appears by the statement (D) that the payments on account of the principal of the public debt will, from the 1st of October, 1810, to the 31st December, 1811, have exceeded six millions four hundred thousand dollars. With the exception of the annual reimbursement of the 6 per cent. and deferred stocks, there will remain at the end of the year 1811, no other portion of the public debt reimbursable at the will of the United States, than the residue of converted stock, amounting, as above stated, to 565,000 dollars, and which will be paid in the year 1812. There being nothing afterwards left, on which the laws, passed subsequent to the year 1801, for the redemption of the debt, can operate, a general view of the result and effect of those laws will now be presented.

Exclusively of near three millions of unfunded debt, since reimbursed, as detailed in the report of 18th of April, 1802; the public debt of the United States amounted on the 1st of April, 1801, to 79,926,999 The whole amount of principal extinguished during the period of ten years and nine months, commencing on the 1st of April, 1801, and ending on the 31st of Dec. 1811, is..... 46,022,810

Leaving the amount of old debt unredeemed on 1st January, 1812..... 33,900,189 And to which adding the Louisiana six per cent. stock, being a new debt contracted subsequent to the 8th of April, 1801..... 11,250,000

Makes the whole amount of public debt on the 1st January, 1812..... 45,154,189

The annual interest on the public debt due on the 1st of April, 1801, amounted to 4,180,463

The annual interest on the public debt extinguished between the 1st of April, 1801, and the 1st January, 1802, amounts to.....	2,632,982
Leaving for the amount of annual interest on the old debt unredeemed on the 1st Jan. 1812.....	1,547,481
The annual interest on the Louisiana stock is.....	675,000
Making the annual interest on the whole debt due on the 1st January, 1812.....	2,222,481
Which subtracted from the annual interest on the debt due on 1st of April, 1801...	4,180,463

Leaves for the difference between the amount of interest respectively payable at those two dates.....	1,967,942
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The disposable national revenue, or that portion which alone is applicable to defray the annual national expences, consists only of the surplus of the gross amount of revenue collected beyond the amount necessary for paying the interest on the public debt. A diminution of that interest is, with respect to the ability of defraying the other annual expences, a positive increase of revenue to the same amount. With an equal amount of gross revenue, the revenue applicable to defray the national expences is now, by the effect of the reduction of the debt, two millions six hundred thousand dollars greater than on the 1st day of April, 1801. Or, if another view of the subject be thought more correct, the laws for the reduction of the debt have in ten years and nine months, enabled the United States to pay in full the purchase money of Louisiana, and increased their revenue near two millions of dollars.—If the amount of annual payments on account of both the principal and interest of the public debt, during the last eight years, be contrasted with the payments hereafter necessary for the same purpose, the difference will be still more striking. Eight millions of dollars have been annually paid on that account during these eight years. The whole amount payable after the year 1812, including the annual reimbursement on the six per cent. and deferred stocks, is 3,792,382 dollars, making an annual difference of more than \$200,000 dollars, which will be liberated from that appropriation. And this annual

payment of about three millions eight hundred thousand dollars, would have been sufficient, with some small variations, to discharge in ten years the whole of the residue of the existing debt, with the exception of the three per cent. stock, the annual interest on which amounts only to 485,000 dollars. The aspect of the foreign relations of the United States, forbids, however, the hope of seeing the work completed within that short period.—The redemption of the principal has been effected without the aid of any internal taxes, either direct or indirect, without any addition during the last seven years to the rate of duties on importations, which, on the contrary, have been impaired by the repeal of that on salt, and notwithstanding the great diminution of commerce during the last four years. It therefore proves, decisively, the ability of the United States, with their ordinary revenue, to discharge, in ten years of peace, a debt of forty-two millions of dollars, a fact which considerably lessens the weight of the most formidable objection to which that revenue, depending almost solely on commerce, appears to be liable. In time of peace, it is almost sufficient to defray the expences of a war; in time of war it is hardly competent to support the expences of a peace establishment. Sinking at once under adverse circumstances from fifteen to six or eight millions of dollars, it is only by a persevering application of the surplus, which it affords in years of prosperity, to the discharge of the debt, that a total change in the system of taxation, or a perpetual accumulation of debt can be avoided. But if a similar application of such surplus be hereafter strictly adhered to, 40 millions of debt contracted during five or six years of war, may always, without any extraordinary exertions, be reimbursed in ten years of peace. This view of the subject has, at the present crisis, appeared necessary for the purpose of distinctly pointing out one of the principal resources within the reach of the United States. But to be placed on a solid foundation, it requires the aid of a revenue "sufficient at least to defray the ordinary expences of Government, and to pay the interest on the public debt, including that on new loans which may be authorized."

PROVISION FOR THE ENSUING YEARS.—The revenue is derived from two sources, the Duties on Importations, and the sales on Public Lands.

The net revenue arising from duties on merchandize and tonnage, which accrued during the year 1809, amounted to.....	6,527,168
The net revenue arising from the same sources, which accrued during the year 1810, amounted as will appear by the statement (A.) and (B.) to.....	12,513,490
The same revenue for the year 1811, is estimated, as has already been stated, at..	7,500,000
A portion of the revenue of this year having been collected on British merchandize imported before the prohibition took effect, the permanent revenue, arising from duties on tonnage and merchandize, will not probably, at their present rate, and under existing circumstances, exceed 6,000,000, an estimate which is corroborated by the view of the subject exhibited in the statement (B. 2.)	
The sales of public lands north of the river Ohio, have during the year ending on the 30th September 1811, amounted, as appears by the statement (C.) to 207,000 acres, and the payments by purchasers to 600,000 dollars. It has already been stated, that those payments on the average of the two last years, amount, after deducting the expences and charges on that fund, to the annual sum of	600,000
The sales in the Mississippi territory, being, in the first instance, appropriated to the payment of 1,250,000 dollars to the state of Georgia, are distinctly stated.	
The permanent revenue, or Dollars. annual receipts, after the year 1812, calculated on the existing state of affairs, may therefore be estimated at.....	6,600,000
Which, deducted from the annual expenditures, calculated on the same principle, and amounting, by the preceding estimate of the year 1812, to.....	2,200,000

Leave a deficiency to be provided for, of..... 2,600,000

An addition of 50 per cent. to the present amount of duties (together with a continuance of the temporary duties heretofore designated by the name of 'Mediterranean Fund') will be sufficient to supply that deficiency, and is respectfully submitted. This mode appears preferable for the present to any internal tax.—With respect to the sales of public lands, besides affording a supplementary fund for the ultimate redemption of the public debt, they may, without any diminution of revenue, be usefully applied as a bounty to soldiers enlisting in the regular service, and in facilitating the terms of loans. But it does not appear that the actual receipts into the Treasury, arising from the sales, can be materially increased, without a reduction in the price ; unless it be by an attempt to offer certain portions for sale in the large cities of the Union.—The same amount of revenue would be necessary, and with the aid of loans, would, it is believed, be sufficient in case of war. The same increase of duties would therefore be equally necessary in that event.—Whether it would be sufficient to produce the same amount of revenue as under existing circumstances, cannot at present be determined. Should any deficiency arise, it may be supplied without difficulty, by a further increase of duties, by a restoration of that on salt, and by a proper selection of moderate internal taxes. To raise a fixed revenue of only nine millions of dollars, is so much within the compass of the national resources, so much less in proportion than is paid by any other nation, that, under any circumstances, it will only require the will of the legislature to effect the object.—The possibility of raising money by loans to the amount which may be wanted, remains to be examined. For the fact that the United States may easily, in ten years of peace, extinguish a debt of forty-two millions of dollars, does not necessarily imply that they could borrow that sum during a period of war.—In the present state of the world, foreign loans may be considered as nearly unattainable. In that respect, as in all others, the United States must solely rely on their own resources. These have their natural bounds, but are believed to be fully adequate to the support of all the national force that can be usefully and efficiently employed.—The ability and will of the United States

faithfully to perform their engagements, are universally known: and the terms of loans will in no shape whatever be affected by the want of confidence in either. They must, however, depend not only on the state of public credit, and on the ability to lend, but also on the existing demand for capital required for other objects.—Whatever this may be, the money wanted by the public must be purchased at its market price. Whenever the amount wanted for the service of the year, or the whole amount of stock in the market, shall exceed certain limits, it may be expected that legal interest will not be sufficient to obtain the sums required. In that case the most simple and direct is also the cheapest and safest mode. It appears much more eligible to pay at once the difference, either by a premium in lands, or by allowing a higher rate of interest, than to increase the amount of stock created, or to attempt any operation which might injuriously affect the circulating medium of the country. This difficulty, and it is the only serious one which has been anticipated, will not, indeed, if analysed, appear very formidable. For, to take an extreme case, and supposing even 40 millions of dollars to be borrowed at eight instead of six per cent. a year, the only difference would consist in the additional payment of eight hundred thousand dollars a year, until the principal was reimbursed; a payment inconvenient indeed, and to be avoided, if practicable—but inconsiderable, if compared either with the effects of other means of raising money, or with some other branches of the public expenditure.—It appears from the preceding estimates, that nothing more may be strictly wanted for defraying, during the year 1812, the expences as yet authorised by law; than an authority to borrow a sum equal to that which may be reimbursed on account of the principal of the public debt. With a view to the ensuing years, and considering the aspect of public affairs presented by the executive, and the measures of expence which he has recommended, it has been attempted to show:—I. That a fixed revenue of about nine millions of dollars is necessary and sufficient, both under the existing situation of the United States, and in the event of their assuming a different attitude.—II. That an addition to the rate of duties on importations is at present sufficient for that purpose, although in the course of events it may require

some aid from other sources of revenue.—III. That a just reliance may be put on obtaining loans to a considerable amount, for defraying the expences which may be incurred beyond the amount of revenue above stated.—IV. That the peace revenue of the United States will be sufficient, without any extraordinary exertions, to discharge in a few years the debt which may be thus necessarily incurred.—All which is respectfully submitted.—ALBERT GALLATIN.—*Treasury Department, Nov. 22, 1811.*

SPAIN.—*Dispatch from Lord Viscount Talavera, relative to the Siege and Capture of Ciudad Rodrigo. Dated Gallegos, 20th Jan. 1812. Addressed to Lord Liverpool, and published in London on the 5th Feb. 1812.*

I informed your Lordship in my dispatch of the 9th, that I had attacked Ciudad Rodrigo, and in that of the 15th, of the progress of the operations to that period; and I have now the pleasure to acquaint your Lordship, that we took the place by storm yesterday evening after dark.—We continued from the 15th to the 19th to complete the second parallel, and the communications with that work; and we had made some progress by sap towards the crest of the glacis. On the night of the 15th, we likewise advanced from the left of the first parallel down the slope of the hill, towards the Convent of St. Francisco, to a situation from which the walls of the Fausse Braye and of the town were seen, on which a battery of seven guns was constructed, and they commenced their fire on the morning of the 18th.—In the mean time, the batteries in the parallel continued their fire; and yesterday evening their fire had not only considerably injured the defences of the place, but had made breaches in the Fausse Braye wall, and in the body of the place, which were considered practicable; while the battery on the slope of the hill, which had been commenced on the night of the 15th, and had opened on the 18th, had been equally efficient still farther to the left, and opposite to the suburb of St. Francisco.—I therefore determined to storm the place, notwithstanding that the approaches had not been brought to the crest of the glacis, and the counterscarp of the ditch was still entire. The attack was accordingly made yesterday evening in five separate columns, consisting of the

troops of the 3rd and right divisions, and of Brigadier-General Pack's brigade. The two light columns, conducted by Lieutenant-Colonel O'Toole, of the 2nd Caçadores, and Major Ridge, of the 5th regiment, were destined to protect the advance of Major-General M'Kinnon's brigade, forming the third, to the top of the breach in the Fausse Braye wall; and all these, being composed of troops of the 3rd division, were under the direction of Lieutenant-General Picton.—The fourth column, consisting of the 43rd and 52nd regiments, and part of the 95th regiment, being of the light division under the direction of Major-General Craufurd, attacked the breaches on the left, in front of the suburb of St. Francisco, and covered the left of the attack of the principal breach by the troops of the 3rd division; and Brigadier-General Pack was destined with his brigade, forming the 5th column, to make a false attack upon the southern face of the fort. Besides these five columns, the 94th regiment, belonging to the 3rd division, descended into the ditch in two columns on the right of Major-General M'Kinnon's brigade, with a view to protect the descent of that body into the ditch, and its attack of the breach in the Fausse Braye, against the obstacles which it was supposed the enemy would construct to oppose their progress.—All these attacks succeeded; and Brigadier-General Pack even surpassed my expectations, having converted his false attack into a real one, and his advanced guard, under the command of Major Lynch, having followed the enemy's troops from the advanced works into the Fausse Braye, where they made prisoners of all opposed to them.—Major Ridge, of the 2nd battalion of the 5th regiment, having descended the Fausse Braye wall, stormed the principal breach in the body of the place, together with the 94th regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, which had moved along the ditch at the same time, and had stormed the breach in the Fausse Braye, both in front of Major-General M'Kinnon's brigade. Thus these regiments not only effectually covered the advance from the trenches of Major-General M'Kinnon's brigade by their first movements and operations, but they preceded them in the attack.—Major-General Craufurd and Major-

General Vandeleur, and the troops of the light division on the left, were likewise very forward on that side; and in less than half an hour from the time the attack commenced, our troops were in possession of, and formed on the ramparts of the place, each body contiguous to the other. The enemy then submitted, having sustained a considerable loss in the contest.—Our loss was also, I am concerned to add, severe, particularly in officers of high rank and estimation in this army. Major General Mac Kinnon was unfortunately blown up by the accidental explosion of one of the enemy's expense magazines, close to the breach, after he had gallantly and successfully led the troops under his command to the attack. Major General Craufurd likewise received a severe wound while he was leading on the light division to the storm, and I am apprehensive that I shall be deprived for some time of his assistance. Major Gen. Vandeleur was likewise wounded in the same manner, but not so severely, and he was able to continue in the field. I have to add to this list, Lieut. Colonel Colbourne, of the 53d regiment, and Major George Napier, who led the storming party of the light division, and was wounded on the top of the breach.—I have great pleasure in reporting to your Lordship the uniform good conduct, spirit of enterprize, and patience and perseverance in the performance of great labour by which the General Officers, officers and troops of the 1st, 3d, 4th, and light divisions, and Brigadier-General Pack's brigade, by whom the siege was carried on, have been distinguished during the late operations. Lieutenant General Graham assisted me in superintending the conduct of the details of the siege, besides performing the duties of the general officer commanding the first division; and I am much indebted to the suggestions and assistance I received from him for the success of this enterprize.—The conduct of all parts of the 3d division, in the operations which they performed with so much gallantry and exactness on the evening of the 19th, in the dark, afford the strongest proof of the abilities of Lieut. General Picton and Major General Mac Kinnon, by whom they were directed and led.

(*To be continued.*)